A failed Venezuelan oil transaction involving Poland’s state-controlled energy group Orlen has put the operational risks of stablecoin-funded trade payments under scrutiny.
The Financial Times reported, in an account summarized by Cointelegraph, that an Orlen trading subsidiary made a $230 million advance to Dubai-based seller Hannon International Middle East in December 2023 for Venezuelan oil. The seller then used brokers and intermediaries to obtain and transfer Tether’s USDT for the transaction. Orlen ultimately received about $29 million of oil before terminating the contract, according to that reporting.
The case does not establish that stablecoin technology caused the loss. Instead, it shows how a fast, transferable digital settlement asset can amplify weaknesses in counterparty approval, transaction authorization, custody and reconciliation when a payment passes through several companies and brokers.
One transaction sits inside a broader criminal case
The figures require careful separation. The newly detailed $230 million advance concerns one reported Venezuelan oil transaction. A January 2025 statement from the Warsaw Regional Prosecutor’s Office concerns three allegedly unfavorable oil-purchase contracts signed between August 21 and December 21, 2023, and places the alleged total damage to Orlen and OTS Switzerland at about $378 million, or roughly 1.5 billion Polish zloty.
The prosecutor’s statement said investigators had sought legal assistance from Switzerland, Singapore and the United Arab Emirates. It also said Poland’s financial-intelligence authority had submitted a notice concerning suspected money laundering connected with benefits allegedly derived from harm to the companies. The official statement did not describe USDT or attribute the wider alleged loss to stablecoin payments.
Cointelegraph, citing the Financial Times, reported that funds in the $230 million transaction moved through multiple conversion and transfer steps. It said Hannon obtained $80 million in USDT from one Dubai financial-services company and later claimed a separate intermediary delivered only $85 million in USDT after receiving $135 million; that intermediary disputes Hannon’s account. The report also described employees giving Caracas brokers two USB devices in transfers said to represent $60 million and $50 million in USDT, followed by access to another $11 million.
Hannon’s legal representative told Cointelegraph that the company entered the transaction at Orlen’s request, was not responsible for its failure and had taken steps to recover funds. Those positions remain the company’s claims. Cointelegraph said it also sought comment from Orlen and Tether.
What payment firms should take from the case
For payment providers, the central lesson is that token settlement does not remove the need to control the full payment chain. A compliance review focused only on the sender and final recipient can miss the risks created by brokers, liquidity providers, informal custody arrangements and last-minute changes to settlement instructions.
In a high-value trade flow, controls should bind an approved legal entity, verified wallet addresses and authorized signers to a specific contract and delivery milestone. Any change in intermediary, wallet or conversion route should trigger renewed approval rather than being treated as a routine operational adjustment. Wallet ownership evidence and transaction hashes should be reconciled against bank transfers and invoices before the next tranche is released.
The reported use of portable devices also underlines the distinction between moving value and handing over control of credentials. Payment policy should define who can create a wallet, where keys may be held, how access is transferred, whether multiple approvals are required and how an organization can recover assets after a disputed handoff. A blockchain record can show where tokens moved, but it does not by itself prove that the right person authorized the transfer or that the off-chain goods were delivered.
Sanctions controls are equally important. The Financial Times account, as relayed by Cointelegraph, linked the use of USDT to Venezuelan state oil company PDVSA’s efforts to work around US financial restrictions. Payment firms need to assess the parties, beneficial owners, jurisdictions, goods and purpose at every stage, rather than assuming that conversion into a stablecoin changes the underlying legal or sanctions exposure.
Stablecoin finality shifts risk toward pre-transaction controls
Bank payments may offer familiar investigation and recall channels, although recovery is never guaranteed. Stablecoin transfers can settle quickly and may be difficult to reverse once the recipient controls the assets. That makes pre-transaction controls and staged release mechanisms more important, particularly when delivery occurs later and in another jurisdiction.
Escrow structures, delivery-versus-payment conditions and independently verified milestones can reduce the amount exposed at any one time. Monitoring should also flag transfers that diverge from the approved route, split across unexpected wallets or depend on newly introduced intermediaries.
The Orlen episode is therefore less a verdict on USDT than a warning about using stablecoin rails inside a poorly bounded commercial process. The technology can improve settlement speed and traceability, but neither feature substitutes for counterparty diligence, custody governance, sanctions review and contract-linked release controls.